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Abstract
We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an
innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for a production department. In response,
the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. We
show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative
eﬀect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department’s eﬀort away from radical
innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works
model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization.
Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D
activities are derived.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is one of the main drivers of a firm’s competitive advantage. Innovation, however, has
often a disruptive eﬀect on the organization because it is associated to or induces organizational
change and adaptation (Henderson and Clark 1990). A new technology, a new product, or a new
marketing method often imply the reshaping of relevant resources and expertise, the change of
established norms and routines, and the rapid obsolescence of accumulated learning (Tushman
and Anderson 1986). The magnitude and intensity of such eﬀects depend on the characteristics
of the innovation, with radical innovations imposing major adjustments within the organization
(Henderson 1993). Change is costly, not only for the firm as a whole, but also for each of its
individual members. For instance, Morrill (1991) identifies several potential sources of costs:
loss of power and prestige, need to retrain and relearn, changing definition of success, fear of
technology, etc. In an attempt to avoid these costs, the employees of the firm might react to
change by fighting it back rather than adapting to it.
How should a firm manage this resistance to change? This issue is of central importance for
a firm’s innovative capability and, ultimately, survival (Gilbert 2006). To address this question,
we build a model where the implementation of a successful innovation, backed by an R&D
department, results in costly changes for a production department. In response, the production
department tries to improve the current technology in an attempt to convince the management
not to implement the innovation. As an example of the type of situation we have in mind,
Foster (1986) describes the case of DuPont and its decision in the 1950s to move from the
established nylon technology to the new polyester technology for the production of car tires.
Behind the decision there was a conflict between production engineers at the nylon plant and
researchers supporting the new technology. The production engineers managed to push the nylon
technology to the limits, and provided suﬃcient evidence to convince the management that the
nylon technology would remain competitive. The polyester technology was eventually shelved.
We model the organizational competition between the two departments using tools borrowed
from contest theory. Contests are situations in which the participants expend money or eﬀort to
increase their chances of winning a prize. Examples include rent-seeking and lobbying situations,
tournaments, arms races, political campaigns, athletic contests, patent races and procurement
of innovations (Taylor 1997; Che and Gale 2003; Ganuza and Hauk 2006). In our model, the
production and the R&D departments are involved in a contest of technologies. The R&D de-
partment tries to develop a new technology while the production department works on improving
the existing one.
We show that organizations with greater resistance to change, i.e. firms whose production
departments face larger costs of re-adjustment, exhibit a lower probability of introducing a new
technology. However, this is not always profit reducing for the firm as a whole. Indeed, it is
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shown that firms with highly motivated and productive R&D departments might benefit from
a stronger resistance to change. By contrast, firms whose R&D departments are weak or badly
motivated suﬀer from stronger resistance to change. More in general and consistent with the
literature on contests, our findings suggest that firms that maintain a balance of powers between
the two departments outperform firms where one department largely dominates the other.1
Although our analysis stresses the positive eﬀects of internal competition, we argue in the
second part of the paper that (the threat of) internal competition might entail important costs
for the firm. In particular, the prospect of a costly contest of technologies might push the
R&D department towards low risk, incremental projects that entail low adaptation costs for the
production department. Such incremental innovations meet much less internal resistance than
radical innovations that require the production department to undertake more costly changes.
Thus, the R&D department refrain from investigating more path-breaking research trajectories
at the detriment of long-run firm profits.
We analyze an organizational solution to this problem, known as the ”skunk works model”
of innovation, which consists in isolating the team of researchers from the influence of the rest
of the organization.2 The skunk works model of innovation has received lots of attention from
management scholars and has been implemented by many large technology firms, such as IBM,
Siemens and Intel, but we are not aware of any formal economic model that attempts to pin down
the virtues of this organizational solution. We show that adopting the skunk works model of
innovation can induce the R&D department to choose a radical research trajectory in situations
where an integrated R&D department would have chosen an incremental trajectory to avoid the
competition with the production department.
This paper is related to several bodies of literature both in economics and management. The
adoption of a new technology is a decision that has important redistributional eﬀects within the
organization. The economics literature has argued that such decisions are subject to ”influence
activities” by the involved parties, i.e. eﬀorts aimed at aﬀecting the decision maker (Meyer et
al. 1992; Milgrom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Such eﬀorts distort resources from more
productive uses, slow down the decision making process, and sometimes prevent organizational
changes altogether (Schaefer 1998). Our approach can be thought of as representing a diﬀerent
time horizon. Shortly before the management decides which technology to use, the performances
of the technologies are more or less given. The departments will therefore spend resources trying
to promote their preferred technology by presenting it well, “buttering up” decision makers, etc.
1Evidence consistent with the notion that this type of organizational competition spurs innovation can be found
in Ginn and Rubinstein (1986). They study 61 new product introductions in a major chemical company. They
show that product introductions leading to more intense competition, measured by how incompatible the R&D
department’s and the production department’s goals are, tend to be more successful than product introductions
causing less competition.
2A windowless facility built by Lockheed at the airport of Burbank, California, during the Cold War was
known as the ”skunk works”. There, secret military projects were developed.
2
This is the situation captured by influence activity models. By contrast, we argue that there is
an incentive earlier in the game to improve the technologies to have as strong a case as possible
should the competition between departments take place. We focus here on this long-run eﬀect,
but this is, of course, not to say that influence activities do not exist or are irrelevant.
Organizational scholars have widely investigated the tension between the exploration of new
alternatives and the exploitation of current capabilities (Levinthal and March 1993; March 1991)
by employing simulation models based on routine adaptation and learning (Rivkin and Siggelkow
2003). Exploitation refers to achieving maximal profits in the current situation whereas explo-
ration refers to the process of searching for new opportunities. In our model, the production
department is involved in exploitative activities, while the R&D department explores new tech-
nological possibilities. Although we leave many of the subtleties in the background, we provide
a diﬀerent, incentive-based view of such a tension. Similarly to this literature, we show that
firms are well-advised in trying to balance explorative and exploitative activities. However, we
also find that exploitation might, under certain conditions, increase exploration by exposing the
R&D department to tougher internal competition.
Besides the already mentioned works, our analysis is related to two papers by Rotemberg
and Saloner. In Rotemberg and Saloner (1995), using a quite diﬀerent model, the authors study
the conflict between the sales and the production departments, with the former wanting a broad
product line and the latter wanting long production lines. The firm can potentially benefit
from the conflict because the two departments present valuable information concerning costs to
defend their respective positions. Nevertheless, as their emphasis is on cost revelation, they do
not study questions related to innovation policies, which is our main interest here. Rotemberg
and Saloner (2000) analyze competition between two R&D teams inside a firm. Again, the focus
of their paper is quite diﬀerent from ours. Rotemberg and Saloner study how hiring a biased
(”visionary”) CEO can induce higher eﬀorts by the teams, but they do not look at issues such as,
e.g., the skunk works model of innovation and the tension between exploitation and exploration,
which constitute the main contribution of our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the basic model
that is then solved and discussed in section 3. Section 4 contains the analysis of the skunk
works model of innovation. In section 5 we analyze and discuss several important contractual
assumptions, and thus extend our basic framework. Section 6 concludes with some implications
for managers. All technical proofs are in the appendix.
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2 The Basic Model
Our firm is composed by three risk-neutral agents: A production unit (PU), a research unit (RU)
and a management unit (MU), which we describe in more detail below. The firm is actually
employing a standard technology to produce a given product, which results in a profit of π1 = 0
if no further improvements are made.
The Research Unit The RU expends unobservable creative eﬀort, eR, that probabilistically
generates valuable innovations or ”ideas”. The creative eﬀort results in a new technology of value
∆R with probability p where ∆R = γeR, and γ > 0. With the complementary probability, 1− p,
the eﬀort is fruitless. The cost of eﬀort is c(eR) = eR. The RU receives a reward B if the new
technology is adopted and 0 if it is not. Here, B can contain both monetary (paid by the firm)
and non-monetary elements such as peer-recognition, career concerns or personal satisfaction.
We will discuss both these possibilities below. The RU is wealth and credit constrained, and a
possible monetary bonus must therefore be non-negative. The RU maximizes its utility, which
is given by the diﬀerence between the expected reward and the cost of creative eﬀort.
The Production Unit The PU expends two types of eﬀort: Production eﬀort and unobserv-
able defensive eﬀort. The production eﬀort is indispensable for running the technology. The PU
receives a payoﬀ normalized to zero as compensation for the production eﬀort. The defensive
eﬀort, eP , enhances the performance of the existing technology. We have in mind changes in
the layout of production facilities, re-engineering of processes, cost reductions obtained through
marginal innovations, elimination of ineﬃciencies, changes in the design of the products which
bring about cost savings or quality improvements, and so on. The defensive eﬀort increases the
payoﬀ of the existing technology by ∆P = eP . The total value of the existing technology is
therefore ∆P . Such eﬀort does not come for free, and the PU incurs a cost of c(eP ) = eP . We
call the eﬀort ”defensive” because the PU expends it only when threatened by a new technology.
The reason is that the PU has made technology-specific investments in the existing technology
such as mastering it, learning how to deal with break downs, establishing routines and rules,
etc. A change of technology forces the PU to reinvest in order to be able to produce. The firm
can partially compensate such costs through training programs, monetary incentives and other
policies. However, totally oﬀsetting the inconveniencies of change might be hard.3 In particular,
we assume that the introduction of a new technology imposes a cost of F on the PU. Faced with
the potential threat of a new technology developed by the RU, the PU is thus willing to exert
eﬀort to improve the existing technology, thereby reducing the likelihood that the new technol-
ogy is adopted. Put diﬀerently, the PU tries to resist change. As an alternative to resisting
3As we discussed in the introduction, the cost of change for the PU should be interpreted broadly to include
also psychological factors.
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change, the PU can leave the firm. We assume that this option bears a cost of K > 0. K can
be interpreted as relocation costs, search costs, reputation concerns, risk of being unemployed
or simply quasi-rents that are lost if the PU moves to another firm. We start by considering
non-monetary incentives only (Section 3) but introduce monetary incentives later on (Section
5). All wages to the PU must be non-negative due to wealth and credit constraints. The PU
maximizes its expected utility, which is equivalent to maximizing the total reward if the current
technology is kept, i.e. the avoided cost of change plus a possible monetary bonus, minus the
cost of the defensive eﬀort (provided that this is a better option than leaving the firm).
The Management Unit The last building block of our firm is the MU whose aim is to
maximize firm profits. We assume that the firm is able to implement at most one technology,
either the existing technology or the new one. There are several reasons why this might be the
case. First, the two technologies might produce exactly the same product. Using both would
therefore lead to ineﬃcient duplication of costs. Second, the two technologies might depend on
diﬀerent organizational routines, and nurturing both of them would generate incompatibilities.
Finally, the technologies might compete for the use of scarce, complementary resources such as
managerial talents, dedicated sales forces, financial resources, etc. (Cassiman and Ueda 2006).
The key decision of the MU is therefore the choice of the technology. The MU either decides
to continue with the existing technology or to implement the new technology, in which case the
PU has to adapt to the new course of actions. Another important choice of the MU concerns
the contracts oﬀered to the two units. The profits of the firm consist of the payoﬀs from the
technology chosen minus all potential payments as compensation or monetary rewards.
Timing If feasible, the MU chooses the reward structure. Then, the RU expends creative eﬀort
to generate a new technology. Simultaneously, the PU expends defensive eﬀort to improve the
performance of the existing technology. After uncertainty is resolved, the MU takes a decision
about which technology to use. At the end of the game, payoﬀs are realized.
3 Solution of the Basic Model
To grasp the intuition and understand the key properties of our framework, we solve the model
in its simplest version. The robustness of the key properties is discussed later on. We assume
here that the MU cannot use monetary instruments to reward our units. Then, the reward to the
PU for maintaining the current technology is the adjustment cost, F , that it has to bear if the
new technology is introduced. The reward, B, to the RU captures non-monetary benefits from
having its innovation implemented. What we have in mind here are benefits such as personal
satisfaction, career concerns, internal recognition and status that motivate the RU but do not
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represent an expense for the firm.4 We will also assume that K ≥ pF , which implies that the
PU will never use the option to leave the firm.
We solve the game starting from the last stage in which the MU makes a decision about the
technologies. Suppose that the RU has developed a new technology. The MU will reject the
technology proposed by the RU if eP > γeR, whereas it will abandon the existing technology if
eP < γeR. This selection rule for the technology is extremely simple and only requires the MU to
make ordinal comparisons among alternatives.5 Both the RU and the PU exert eﬀorts in order to
influence the MU’s decision in their respective interest. This competition between departments
can be conceived as a contest with exogenously given diﬀerent prizes for the contestants. As tie-
breaking rule, we assume that if eP = γeR the MU chooses the technology of the dominant unit,
i.e. the unit with the highest willingness to invest in the contest. This assumption is commonly
made in the contest literature (see, for instance, Che and Gale 2003, page 653). It is of a similar
nature to the assumption that guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a game
of Bertrand competition with homogenous products and asymmetric costs.
We distinguish two cases: F > γB and F < γB. In the first case the PU would win if both
units invested the full value of their prize into the contest. We will say that the PU "dominates"
in this case. It corresponds, e.g., to the situation where inertial forces inside the firm are very
strong and production workers and engineers are very adverse to change (F large), i.e. there is
a strong resistance to change. The researchers are not or cannot be strongly motivated (B low),
or their creative eﬀort maps very poorly into valuable technology (γ low). In the second case the
RU dominates, i.e. it would win if both units invested the full value of their prize into the contest.
This corresponds to a firm with very flexible human capital in its production department that
does not fear change (F low). It is also a firm with highly motivated and capable researchers (B
high and γ high).
Before finding the equilibrium of the contest, we establish the following result.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Intuitive proof: Since the new technology only materializes with probability p, the maximum
amount of eﬀort that the PU and the RU are willing to exert are pF and pB, respectively.
Consider the case in which F > γB. The other case is symmetric. For any eR ≤ pB, the PU is
willing to make a defensive eﬀort such that the MU’s decision is tilted in its favor. If it chooses
such an eﬀort, the best response of the RU is to exert no creative eﬀort. However, the best
response to eR = 0 is eP = 0 given the tie-breaking rule assumed. This is still not an equilibrium
4A recent paper by Stern (2004) shows that scientists are willing to give up some monetary rewards in exchange
for the possibility to work on their preferred research agenda.
5 In addition, diﬀerent selection rules based on cardinal comparisons among alternatives suﬀer from commitment
problems since, although possibly profit enhancing ex-ante, they imply ineﬃcient decisions ex-post. We discuss
this issue further in the conclusion.
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because the RU can do better by exerting a creative eﬀort just large enough to win the contest.
As this circular argument suggests, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. ¥
Lemma 1 is a standard result in the contest literature (Taylor 1997; Che and Gale 2003). A
potential avenue to rescue a pure strategy equilibrium is to make the relationship between the
eﬀorts of the contestants and the value of their technology less deterministic.6 For instance, one
could assume that ∆R and ∆P are stochastic variables whose distributions depend on eR and
eP respectively, and that the eﬀort cost functions are convex. Although this formulation would
deliver a pure strategy equilibrium, it turns out to be much harder to handle analytically. Thus,
the literature on contests has broadly resorted to mixed strategy equilibria that are much easier
to solve in explicit form (Che and Gale 2003; Burguet and Che 2004; Konrad 2006). Since the
solution allows a very intuitive interpretation as well, we have chosen to follow in this tradition.
Lemma 2 states the mixed strategy equilibrium for the case where the RU dominates the
contest, F < γB. In the proof (see the Appendix) we derive the equilibrium in some detail to
illustrate how it is constructed. Hillman and Riley (1989) show that the equilibrium reported
here is in fact the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (F < γB: The RU dominates) In equilibrium the PU randomizes according to the
distribution function G(eP ) = 1− FγB +
eP
pγB for all eP ∈ [0, pF ] and the RU randomizes according
to the distribution function H(eR) =
γeR
pF for all eR ∈
h
0, pFγ
i
. The expected payoﬀs for the PU,
the RU and the firm are respectively: UP = −pF , UR = p
³
B − Fγ
´
, and Π = pFγB
F (3−2p)+3γpB
6 .
The next lemma summarizes the equilibrium outcome for the case where the PU dominates,
F > γB. The equilibria of all the contests we present in the rest of paper are derived using
the method illustrated in the proof of Lemma 2. For this reason, we present the equilibrium
strategies, often in the Appendix, but leave out the algebra. Details are available from the
authors upon request.
Lemma 3 (F > γB: The PU dominates) In equilibrium the PU randomizes according to
G(eP ) = ePpγB for all eP ∈ [0, pγB] and the RU randomizes according to H(eR) = 1−
γB
F +
γeR
pF
for all eR ∈ [0, pB]. The expected payoﬀs for the PU, the RU, and the firm are respectively:
UP = −pγB, UR = 0, and Π = BF
γp(3F+γpB)
6 .
The following remarks describe and compare the equilibrium outcomes for diﬀerent values of
the exogenous parameters.
6Another alternative is to use a contest function to determine the winner. Here, the probability to win the prize
increases with a contestant’s eﬀort and decreases with the rival’s eﬀort in a continuous manner. We have preferred
not to resort to such a function because it leaves unspecified the decision process, which plays an important role
in our story, and it requires further assumptions on how eﬀorts map into profits.
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Remark 1 (Expected eﬀorts) The expected creative eﬀort is B
2pγ
2F if F > γB and
Fp
2γ if F < γB,
whereas the expected defensive eﬀort is Bpγ2 if F > γB and
F 2p
2Bγ if F < γB.
Remark 2 (Comparative statics) When the RU dominates, the expected creative eﬀort is in-
creasing in F and decreasing in γ, whereas the expected defensive eﬀort is increasing in F and
decreasing in γ and B. Expected profits are increasing in F and decreasing in γ and B. When
the PU dominates, the expected creative eﬀort is increasing in B and γ and decreasing in F ,
whereas the expected defensive eﬀort is increasing in B and γ. Expected profits are increasing
in B and γ and decreasing in F . Finally, expected eﬀorts as well as expected profits are always
increasing in the probability that the new technology is developed, p.
To interpret these comparative static results one should bear in mind that the eﬀorts exerted
by the two units are aimed at influencing the MU’s decision between the existing and the new
technology. First, it is obvious that the eﬀorts of the PU and the RU are (weakly) increasing in
their respective rewards, F and B. Second, it is interesting to notice that a larger F does not
necessarily mean less profits, as one might have expected given that F parametrizes resistance
to change.7 In fact, when the RU dominates, a larger F implies that both units exert more eﬀort
and hence profits are higher.8 More in general, these comparative statics suggest that the firm
always prefers to maintain a balance of powers between the RU and the PU. In particular, for
given B and γ the profits of the firm are maximized for the value of F that makes the contestants
equally strong, F = γB. These arguments are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Principle of balanced competition) The firm benefits if the relative strength
of the two departments is balanced.
The principle of balanced competition is perhaps best understood using an analogy to a track
race. A weak runner will not spend a lot of energy racing against a much faster competitor as
the chance of winning the race is low. The slow pace of the weak runner, in turn, slows down the
strong runner. After all, there is no reason to waste energy and risk injury by running fast when
this is not needed to win the race. In order to make runners perform their best, they should thus
be matched against a competitor of equal strength. This is the same basic idea underlying the
result of Proposition 1.
A couple of issues related to this principle deserves discussion. We study competition in
technologies, but Proposition 1 applies more broadly to competitions inside the firm. Inderst
and Laux (2005), e.g., analyze how competition for scarce internal funds can stimulate innovation.
7By the same argument, having a more motivated R&D department might not always be profit enhancing.
8Notice that the probability of the RU winning the contest is pBγ/2F when PU dominates and p(1−F/2Bγ)
otherwise. Thus, the expected probability of observing a change in the technology is still decreasing in F .
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They find, in the line with Proposition 1, that the positive eﬀect of competition on innovation is
strongest when the departments are equally strong.
Until now we have focused solely on the positive eﬀects of internal competition. Obviously,
competition between two departments might have several negative aspects that we do not account
for in our framework. For example, the development of a new technology might require a strict
collaboration between production and R&D where both departments benefit from reciprocal
feedback. Strong competition might hamper such collaboration. Strong internal competition
might also generate undesirable behaviors from each department, like for instance unproductive
influence activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Firms might have to optimally design their
organizations to minimize such negative side eﬀects and fully exploit the benefits of internal
competition.9 In section 4, we shall analyze a situation in which too tough internal competition
leads to a distortion in the RU’s choice of the research trajectory, and we study how this problem
can be ameliorated with an appropriate organizational design.
3.1 Exploitation versus Exploration
The principle of balanced competition is reminiscent of the suggestion by organization theorists
that the firm should pursue a balance between exploration of new alternatives and the exploita-
tion of current capabilities (Levinthal and March 1993; March 1991; Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003).
As Levinthal and March (1993) put it, ”...the basic problem confronting an organization is to
engage in suﬃcient exploitation to ensure its current viability and, at the same time, to devote
enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability”.
However, exploitation and exploration are in constant tension. In fact, adaptation to existing
environmental demands may foster structural inertia and reduce a firm’s capacity to adapt to
future environmental changes and new opportunities. In other words, a firm that invests in
augmenting its current capabilities and maintaining its current focus might perform rather poorly
in generating ideas that are outside its core capabilities. Our framework can also handle this
possibility, and provide a diﬀerent, incentive-based explanation of the well-researched tension
between exploitative and explorative activities.
Assume that there is a previous period (t = 0) before the very same game described above
(t = 1). In period 0 the firm uses the standard technology. This activity generates profits π0(α)
where α measures the degree of exploitation. By exploiting the current technology, the MU
takes actions that make the production and distribution more eﬃcient, eliminate slacks, routinize
activities, enhance specialization and expertise. Hence, we assume that ∂π0(α)/∂α > 0. The
cost of pushing up the exploitation of the standard technology in period 0 is C(α). Here, C(α)
is assumed to be suﬃciently convex to ensure that the firm’s problem is concave in α.
9Milgrom (1988) has, e.g., argued that bureaucratic rules limiting managerial discretion can be used to reduce
wasteful influence activities.
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In period 1 the PU can improve the standard technology as before. Thus, the improvements
are on top of π0(α). The more the firm invests in the standard technology in period 0 the stronger
the PU is in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that p = 1. Also, let γB − π0(α) > 0 in the
relevant range, otherwise the best strategy for the RU is always to exert zero creative eﬀort.
The following lemma reports the expected period 1 profits as a function of α and π0(α).
Lemma 4 If the PU dominates (F + π0(α) > γB), then
π1(α) =
(Bγ − π0(α))(Bγ(3F +Bγ) + (3F − 2Bγ)π0(α) + π0(α)2)
6BFγ
and ∂π1(α)/∂α < 0. If instead the RU dominates (F + π0(α) < γB), then
π1(α) =
F 2 + 3BFγ − 3Fπ0(α) + 12Bγπ0(α)
6Bγ
,
and ∂π1(α)/∂α > 0.
We now turn to the firm’s optimal choice of α in period 0.
Proposition 2 Let a myopic firm be a firm that maximizes profits period by period. If a myopic
firm in period 0 chooses a level of α such that the PU dominates in period 1, then a fully rational,
forward-looking firm invests less in the standard technology than a myopic one. However, if a
myopic firm in period 0 chooses a level of α such that the RU dominates in period 1, then a fully
rational, forward-looking firm invests more in the standard technology than a myopic one.
Greater investment in exploiting the standard technology makes the PU stronger. Indeed,
it becomes harder for the RU to produce enough creative eﬀort to change the status-quo. Put
diﬀerently, greater exploitation tilts the contest between the RU and the PU in favor of the latter.
As long as the PU is already strong and has an advantage in the contest, exploitation makes the
competition between the two units even more unbalanced, so it erodes incentives to exert eﬀorts
and reduces profits in period 1. For this reason, a forward-looking firm would invest less in the
standard technology than a myopic firm that only considers period 0 profits when choosing the
optimal degree of exploitation. This corresponds well to the notion that exploiting the current
technology may hinder the exploration of future opportunities. Nevertheless, our model suggests
that this is only a part of the story. When the RU is the strongest unit, for instance because
the firm is operating in a fast developing technological area, further exploitation helps making
the competition between the two units tougher and increases both explorative activities and
expected profits.
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4 The Skunk Works Model of Innovation
The outcome of the innovation process not only depends on the intensity of the creative eﬀort,
but also on the locus of search. Often researchers have the freedom to choose among an array of
research trajectories that encompass diﬀerent levels of uncertainty, diﬀerent types of potential in-
novations, diﬀerent knowledge bases, diﬀerent technological competences, among other features.
Most importantly from our perspective, while some of these research trajectories, if successful,
might lead to important adaptation costs for the PU (large F ), others might instead come at
small or no adaptation costs (F ' 0). Indeed, some research trajectories are more probable
to deliver ”radical innovations”, while other trajectories are more likely to lead to ”incremental
innovations”. Radical innovations are based on a new set of routines and expertise. Incremental
innovations are based on existing routines and expertise (Henderson 1993).10
Not surprisingly, a research trajectory which might lead to radical innovations (henceforth,
a radical trajectory) is likely to meet stronger resistance from the PU (Ginn and Rubenstein
1986). Indeed, Gilbert (2006) argues that the organizational rigidity increases in the level of
threat perceived by the organization. To avoid a costly internal contest, the RU might thus
turn to a research trajectory that produces incremental innovations (henceforth, an incremental
trajectory). Hence, although the competition between the PU and the RU acts as an incentive
mechanism, it might also produce a distortion towards less profitable, incremental trajectories.
To stimulate radical innovations, researchers are often isolated from the influence of the rest
of the organization. This has become known as the ”skunk works model” of innovation. The
skunk works model was, e.g., the organizational design followed by IBM to nurture the by then
revolutionary PC (Roberts 2004), and it is employed by many large innovative firms, such as
Intel, HP and Apple, to develop potential breakthroughs.
The skunk works model is claimed to bring several advantages. Echoing the discussion on
myopia in organizational learning (March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993), it gives researchers
the necessary autonomy, independence and freedom to escape the established lines of thought
and produce novel ideas. See, also, Christensen (1997). Closer to the argument of this paper, it
can also help to overcome the resistance that radical innovations meet inside the organization.11
In the following, we explore the latter advantage using a variation of the basic model developed
in sections 2 and 3.
10 In the organization literature these two kinds of innovations are often referred to as competence destroying
and competence enhancing innovations (Tushman and Anderson 1986).
11The Aurora project set up by Teradyne in the mid 90s is exemplar of this situation. Teradyne was the
market leader (with about 22% of the world market) in automatic test equipment used in the production of
semiconductors. Teradyne employed a technology based on UNIX operating system software, and was trying
to shift to the CMOS technology based on Windows NT. In order to overcome the very high organizational
resistance to this change, the company decided to create an independent unit, called the Aurora project, that had
the autonomy and resources to work on the new technology (Bower 2005).
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4.1 The Model
Let us assume that there are two possible research trajectories, an incremental trajectory and a
radical trajectory. The RU chooses the research trajectory before the game analyzed in section
3 starts.
Assumption 1. The characteristics of the two trajectories are:
Incremental trajectory: FI ≥ 0, pI = 1, γI = 1, BI = B > 0,
Radical trajectory: FR > FI , pR = p < 1, γR = γ > 1, BR = ρB with ρ > 1.
Assumption 2. The RU dominates when the incremental trajectory is chosen, i.e. B > FI .
Assumption 1 makes operational the idea of diﬀerent research trajectories. The incremental
trajectory leads to innovation with certainty. The innovation builds on the current competences
and expertise, so it results in smaller adaptation costs for the PU. Nevertheless, for the RU
it is not a particularly "exciting” trajectory, and the reward from having the new technology
implemented is lower. Instead the radical trajectory is riskier, imposes larger adaptation costs
upon the PU, but implies a higher potential reward for the RU. Assumption 2 and Lemma 2
imply that the RU is guaranteed a positive expected payoﬀ if it chooses the incremental trajectory
in equilibrium, i.e. UR = B − FI > 0. This is more than plausible as the resistance exerted by
the PU is low. In the limit for FI = 0, Assumption 2 is always satisfied.
Finally, to make the problem interesting, we assume that if the PU observes the choice of the
trajectory and can react to it, the RU chooses the incremental trajectory rather than the radical
one to avoid a costly internal contest with the PU. The cost of internal competition is thus
suﬃciently high to potentially influence the choice of the research trajectory. From Lemmata 2
and 3 it follows that this is the case if the following condition holds:
Assumption 3. B − FI > Max
n
0, p(ρB − FRγ )
o
.
Below we shall investigate whether the firm can improve its expected profits by isolating the
RU and creating a skunk works model of innovation. The crucial diﬀerence between having the
RU integrated in the firm and the skunk works model is the amount of information that the PU
receives about the RU’s actions. In particular, we assume that the PU observes the choice of the
research trajectory if the RU is integrated in the firm but it does not if it is isolated. From a
game theoretic point of view the diﬀerence between an integrated innovation model and a skunk
works model boils down to the timing of the game. In the integrated model, analyzed so far, the
research trajectory is chosen (and observed) before defensive and creative eﬀorts are exerted. In
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the skunk works model the choices of research trajectory and eﬀorts are all simultaneous.12 For
simplicity, we focus on pure strategies in the choice of the research trajectory.
The timing of the game is as follows. At t=1 the MU decides how to organize innovation
activity by choosing between an integrated model and the skunk works model. At t=2 the RU
chooses which research trajectory to focus on, radical or incremental. At t=3 the two units
simultaneously exert eﬀort. Then, in case of the radical trajectory, nature determines whether
the new technology is a success or a failure. At t=4 the MU observes the outcome of the
innovation process and decides whether to adopt the new technology. Finally, at t=5 all payoﬀs
are realized.
4.2 The Equilibrium Analysis
The next proposition states our main result concerning the skunk works model.
Proposition 3 Let pρ > 1, i.e. the expected reward of the RU is larger in case of radical
trajectory. Then, the RU chooses the radical trajectory under the skunk works model of innovation
and the incremental trajectory under the integrated model of innovation.
Proposition 3 shows that by implementing a skunk works model the firm can make the radical
trajectory the equilibrium outcome of the game when this trajectory is suﬃciently attractive for
the RU. By contrast, assumption 2 implies that this is never the equilibrium outcome under the
integrated innovation model. The intuition behind this finding is the following: In the integrated
innovation model, the PU observes the choice of the trajectory. The radical trajectory is therefore
unattractive for the RU because it results in strong defensive eﬀort from the PU. In the skunk
works model, on the other hand, the PU does not observe the trajectory chosen. Hence, if the
radical trajectory is suﬃciently attractive for the RU, the choice of the incremental trajectory
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. The RU would deviate to the radical trajectory
in such an equilibrium because it could do so without triggering additional defensive eﬀort by the
non-suspecting PU. We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that the skunk works model instead
results in an equilibrium where the RU chooses the radical trajectory. Of course, this is expected
by the PU, and the two units exert therefore high eﬀort in equilibrium.
Loosely speaking, in the integrated model the PU and RU can "collude" on the incremental
trajectory, an outcome they both prefer vis-à-vis an equilibrium where the radical trajectory is
chosen because the PU punishes a deviation to the radical trajectory by exerting a high amount
of defensive eﬀort. Instead, in the skunk works model of innovation the collusion cannot be
sustained because the PU does not observe such a deviation.
12The research trajectory is chosen before the creative eﬀort, but these two choices are observed simultaneously
by the PU.
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FR = γρB
Assumption 3
FR
ρ1/p
Skunk Works Model
FI
πR = πI
πR = πI
Integrated Model
Figure 1: The equilibrium choice of the innovation model in a specific example (B = 0.5, p = 0.5,
FI = 0.4, γ = 1.2). Assumption 3 is satisfied above the line with this legend. When the radical
trajectory is chosen the PU dominates above the FR = γρB−line and the RU dominates below.
The skunk works model changes the equilibrium outcome from the incremental to the radical
trajectory to the right of the line ρ = 1/p. The radical trajectory results in higher profits than
the incremental trajectory north-east of the two πR = πI−lines.
Although the skunk works model can induce the RU to choose a radical trajectory under
circumstances in which it otherwise would have chosen an incremental trajectory, it depends on
the specific parameters of the two trajectories whether or not this is beneficial to the firm. Notice
that when FI = 0 the incremental trajectory gives rise to expected profits equal to zero, thus
the firm always prefers the radical trajectory. In general, however, it is necessary to compare the
expected profits of the two trajectories using Lemmata 2 and 3.13
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium choice of the innovation model for a numerical example.
The interesting part of the figure is to the right of the ρ = 1/p-line where the skunk works
model induces the RU to switch to the radical trajectory (Proposition 3). In this region the MU
implements the skunk works model for high values of FR and ρ. Here, the stakes are high for
the two units when the radical trajectory is chosen, which, in turn, translates into high eﬀorts
and profits. For lower values of FR and ρ, the incremental trajectory is more profitable, and the
MU keeps the RU integrated in the firm.
13Of course, the skunk works model can have several costs that we have ignored in the present formulation for
the sake of simplicity. For instance, the skunk works model can increase managing costs, can reduce collaboration
between the PU and the RU, or can simply have important set up costs. All these elements should be taken into
account and would reduce its profitability.
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Summarizing, our analysis imply that the firm can benefit from a skunk works model when
resistance to change in case of a radical innovation is particularly strong, and would induce
researchers to follow more incremental research trajectories under the integrated model. This
problem is particularly acute in organizations that show very high adaptation costs in case of
radical innovations. This is often the case for large bureaucratic corporations or established
market leaders within a given technological paradigm (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Ghemawat
1991; Henderson 1993).
5 Monetary Incentives
In this section we generalize the previous analysis by introducing monetary incentives and partic-
ipation constraints for the PU and the RU. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the RU faces
monetary incentives only, whereas the PU is motivated by a combination of monetary incentives
and the cost of change, F .
The use of monetary incentive schemes provides the MU with better tools to shape the
incentives inside the organization. At the same time, the participation constraints force the MU
to partly internalize the costs that internal competition imposes on the PU and the RU.
We start by analyzing the optimal incentive scheme in a benchmark case where it is possible
to contract directly on the value of the technologies. Afterwards, we turn to the analysis of
the main case where contracting possibilities are more limited and internal competition plays an
important role in providing incentives.
5.1 Benchmark Case: Contracting on Value
5.1.1 The Setup
The MU oﬀers a contract CP to the PU that specifies the wage W as a function of the value
of the current technology VP , i.e. CP = W (VP ). Similarly, the RU is oﬀered a contract CR
that specifies the wage B as function of the value of the new technology, VR. The contract also
specifies a wage B(∅) if the RU reports that no innovation is made; thus, CR = (B(VR), B(∅)).
Due to wealth and credit constraints, all wages must be non-negative.
5.1.2 The Optimal Contracts
The contracts have to induce the desired eﬀorts and thereby oﬀer a payoﬀ that is no less than
the outside option. In this setup it is particularly simple for the MU to control the two units’
eﬀorts because there is a one-to-one relation between the eﬀort and the value of the technology.
The MU can thus oﬀer a contract that pays a strictly positive wage if and only if the technology
has a value corresponding to the desired eﬀort level.
The following proposition states the optimal contracts.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that it is possible to contract on the value of the technologies. Then,
the optimal contracts induce the maximal creative eﬀort and no defensive eﬀort:
CP :W (VP ) =
½
Max{0, pF −K} if VP = 0,
0 otherwise.
,
CR : B(VR) =
½
eR/p if VR = γeR,
0 otherwise.
and B(∅) = 0.
Proposition 4 shows that if contracting possibilities are very good, the MU will rely solely on
the eﬀort of the RU. The reason is two-fold. First, the RU is induced to exert the highest eﬀort
because creative eﬀort is more productive than defensive eﬀort. The investment of one unit of
creative eﬀort produces a new technology with an expected value of pρ > 1 whereas one unit of
defensive eﬀort only improves the value of the current technology by 1. Second, given the PU’s
technology is implemented only if the RU is unsuccessful, which occurs with probability 1 − p,
the defensive eﬀort has a negative net value. The participation constraint of the PU forces the
MU to internalize both the costs and the benefits of defensive eﬀort, and thus the PU is not
induced to exert defensive eﬀort.
The contract CR compensates the RU for the cost of eﬀort and leaves the RU with an expected
payoﬀ of zero. The contract CP ensures the participation of the PU by paying a positive fixed
wage if the expected cost of implementing the new technology is higher than the cost of switching
employer.
More generally, the analysis of the benchmark case highlights the two distinct roles that
defensive eﬀort plays in the basic model. It spurs creative eﬀort by intensifying the internal
competition in technologies, and it increases profits directly in situations where the RU is unsuc-
cessful or develops a new technology of lower value than the current technology. If the MU can
control the creative eﬀort by contracting on the value of the new technology, the former role of
defensive eﬀort disappears. The latter role still remains, but this alone does not justify the cost
of monetary incentives.
5.2 Contracting on the Implementation of the Technology
We now assume that it is either impossible or prohibitively expensive for outsiders to measure
the value generated by the technology. This is, e.g., likely to be the case in large diversified
firms with many diﬀerent sources of revenues where it is diﬃcult to verify the exact project
cash flow in court. Thus, contracts based on the value of the technology are no longer feasible.
Alternatively, the MU could contract on certain characteristics of the technology such as design
and functionality, but we assume that it does not possess the necessary technical expertise to
procure technologies in this way. We follow Rotemberg and Saloner (1994, 2000) in assuming
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that the only information available to contract upon is whether the technology proposed by the
RU is implemented or not. This can either be thought of as an explicit contract upheld in court
or as an implicit contract maintained through reputational concerns.
5.2.1 The Setup
At the beginning of the game the MU oﬀers a contract to each of the two units. The contract to
the RU consists of a bonus B if the new technology is implemented, CR = B. The contract to
the PU consists of a bonus W if the current technology is maintained. The net utility resulting
from the bonus is not always suﬃcient to compensate for the cost of change. For this reason,
the contract to the PU might also include a fixed wage fW to ensure participation of the PU,
CP = (W,fW ).
The two units observe the oﬀers made and calculate the expected payoﬀ from accepting the
contract. They accept the contract if and only if the expected payoﬀ is greater than the outside
option. If the contracts are accepted, the RU and the PU simultaneously exert eﬀorts. After
uncertainty is resolved, the MU chooses the most profitable technology. At the end of the game,
wages are paid and profits are realized.
5.2.2 The Optimal Contracts
We solve the game backwards and look first at the MU’s choice between the two technologies.
Unlike the basic model, the MU takes the bonuses into account because they represent a cost of
using the technology in question. The MU chooses the new technology developed by the RU if
VP −W ≤ VR − B ⇔ eP −W < γeR − B. Hence, the PU dominates the RU in the contest of
technologies if and only if p(F +W )−W ≥ pγB −B.
From the analysis of the basic model, it should be clear that the MU would never oﬀer bonuses
such that the RU dominates the internal competition. If so, the MU could reduce B by some
small amount, which would both reduce the expected wage bill and increase the expected eﬀorts
due to tougher internal competition. We can thus restrict attention to contracts such that the
PU weakly dominates the competition.
The following lemma summarizes the analysis of the competition between the PU and the
RU:
Lemma 5 Suppose that the PU and the RU have accepted the proposed contracts. Let pF − (1−
p)W ≥ (pγ− 1)B such that the PU dominates the internal competition. The expected payoﬀs for
the PU, the RU, and the firm are, respectively: UP = fW − (γ − 1)B, UR = 0, and
Π(B,W,fW ) = ( (B−W )2(2B+3F+W )−3Bpγ(B2+2BF+W 2)+3(Bpγ)2(F+W )+(Bpγ)36Bp(F+W )γ −fW if B > WB((3pγ−6)(F+W )+Bp2γ2)
6(F+W ) −fW otherwise .
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At the first stage of the game, the MU decides which contracts to oﬀer. The MU does not
have to worry about the RU rejecting the contract, as the RU can secure itself a payoﬀ of zero
by choosing eR = 0. The PU can avoid the cost of eﬀort by choosing eP = 0 but not the cost
of change. Hence, the contract CP has to satisfy a voluntary participation constraint (VPCPU )
that ensures to the PU an expected payoﬀ greater than or equal to the outside option.
Using the results of Lemma 5, the optimal contracts solve the following program:
Max{B,W,?W )Π(B,W,fW ) (Program of the MU)
st. fW − (pγ − 1)B ≥ −K (VPCPU )
The next proposition characterizes the solution to this program.
Proposition 5 Suppose that it is possible to contract upon the implementation of the new tech-
nology. Then, the optimal contract to the PU neither includes a fixed wage nor a bonus if the
current technology is maintained: CP = (W,fW ) = (0, 0). The optimal contract to the RU is as
follows:
i) If pF ≤ K, the optimal contract is chosen such that the competition is balanced: CR = B =
pF/(pγ − 1).
ii) If pF > K, the optimal bonus is chosen such that the participation constraint of the PU binds:
CR = B = K/(pγ − 1).
Proposition 5 confirms the principle of balanced competition but with some qualifications.
Part i) shows that if the participation constraint of the PU does not bind, either because the cost
of change is low or the outside option is unattractive, the MU will oﬀer contracts that balance
the internal competition. However, the MU only oﬀers a monetary bonus to the RU and relies on
the non-monetary cost of change F to motivate the PU. The reason is, as discussed above, that
the PU’s eﬀort comes at a higher cost than the value it creates to the firm. Oﬀering a monetary
bonus to both units in order to obtain higher eﬀorts is therefore not profitable.
Part ii) of Proposition 5 concerns the case where a fully balanced conflict would require a
fixed wage to the PU to ensure that CP is accepted.14 Here, the MU uses B to balance the
conflict, but only up to the point where the voluntary participation constraint of the PU binds.
Increasing B beyond this threshold would make the RU stronger, balance the conflict further,
and result in higher eﬀorts. However, the extra cost in terms of higher wages outweighs the
expected benefit, and the MU prefers to maintain the competition unbalanced.
5.2.3 Discussion
We have followed an incomplete contract approach by assuming that the characteristics of a
technology can be observed ex-post, in particular its value, but cannot be included in a contract
14Notice that the payoﬀ of the PU is decreasing in the strength of the RU.
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ex-ante. In recent years, there has been a heated debate in economics concerning the foundations
for this type of contractual incompleteness. In an influential paper, Maskin and Tirole (1999)
show that as long as the players can forecast the payoﬀs from their actions ex-ante and can
observe the characteristics of the technology ex-post, they can design mechanisms (so-called
"message games") that allow them to obtain the same outcome as they would have obtained
had it been possible to contract directly on the characteristics of the technology. The rejoinder
from proponents of the incomplete contract approach has been to show that such mechanisms
do not do better than no ex-ante contract if technologies are suﬃcient complex to describe and
the parties cannot refrain from renegotiating undesirable outcomes (Hart and Moore 1999; Segal
1999).
We have nothing to add to this ongoing debate, and we acknowledge that our work is exposed
to the Maskin-Tirole type of criticism. Nevertheless, we would like to note that the assumption
that the values of the technologies are perfectly observed ex-post is stronger than needed. We
have explored an alternative setup where the MU only observes which technology is the most
valuable one, but it does not observe the absolute values. This assumption captures the idea that
one of the advantages of a contest is that it requires only ordinal comparisons among alternatives.
Adopting this alternative assumption comes at a cost in terms of the complexity of the analysis
but does not change our results qualitatively.
At this stage, one can wonder how the insights from the skunk works model of innovation
change if we allow for monetary incentives to the RU. The short answer is not so much. One
needs to distinguish between two cases: whether the monetary reward can or cannot be made
contingent upon the trajectory chosen (radical vs. incremental).
In the case of contingent rewards, the MU will only pay a bonus if the radical trajectory is
chosen.15 It can choose a reward large enough such that the RU prefers the radical trajectory
despite the strong competition from the PU. However, this might result in a very high wage bill
and the MU might still find the skunk works model of innovation an attractive solution. In fact,
one can show that under the skunk works model the RU chooses the radical trajectory for a
smaller bonus paid contingent on a radical technology being adopted.
When the rewards cannot be made contingent upon the trajectory chosen - which we believe
is the most plausible situation - the MU cannot use monetary incentives to induce the choice
of the radical trajectory. The analysis of the previous section applies almost unchanged. The
only diﬀerence is that now the MU can use a monetary reward to make the competition more
balanced and thus increase its expected profits.
A last issue that deserves some discussion concerns the productivity of the PU. It has been
assumed that the defensive eﬀort produces no value added, which drives the result that no
15We focus on the interesting case in which the firm prefers the radical trajectory but the RU chooses the
incremental trajectory to avoid costly competition from the PU.
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monetary bonus is oﬀered to the PU. Of course, if the defensive eﬀort were suﬃciently productive,
it would be optimal to oﬀer a monetary bonus to the PU as well. In this case, the optimal
contracts balance the internal competition, include a monetary bonus to both units, and induce
one of the units to exert the maximal eﬀort. Since little additional insights are added we have
preferred to leave this analysis out of the paper.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
When a firm innovates, its organization, or parts of it, need to undergo some changes to adapt
to the new course of actions. This process is likely to entail costs, and often the introduction of
an innovation faces some internal resistance. In this paper we have analyzed a case in which an
innovation imposes re-adjustment costs upon a production department that, in response to this
threat, tries to resist change by making the current technology more valuable to the firm. This
situation is modelled as an internal competition between an R&D department that investigates
and proposes new solutions, and a production department that defends the status-quo. We have
shown that stronger resistance to change due to larger re-adjustment costs is not necessarily a
problem for a firm. To the contrary, firms with a capable R&D department can leverage such
resistance to change to foster more valuable innovations as well as larger improvements of the
existing technology.
A key insight from our analysis is what we have labeled as the "principle of balanced com-
petition". In fact, we have shown that, other things equal, firms that successfully maintain a
balance between the two departments outperform firms where one department largely dominates
the other. Balanced internal competition stimulates eﬀorts both from the production department
to improve and perfect the actual technology and from the R&D department to investigate and
propose even better solutions.
The principle of balanced competition is similar in spirit to the recommendation by orga-
nization scholars that the successful firm should pursue a balance between exploration of new
alternatives and the exploitation of current capabilities (Levinthal and March 1993; Rivkin and
Siggelkow 2003). In our model, while the production department is devoted to improve and
perfect the actual technology, the R&D department is in charge of identifying and exploring new
opportunities. We contribute to this literature by oﬀering a diﬀerent, incentive-based view of
the tension between exploitative and explorative activities. The traditional argument is that
by investing too much in one activity the firm develops routines and accumulates learning that
are idiosyncratic to this activity, and that reduces its ability to perform the other activity. In-
stead, we argue here that the firm should maintain a balance between these activities because
they compete for scarce resources, and such competition generates the highest payoﬀ to the firm
when it is equal footed.
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This principle has important implications for practitioners too. In fact, there are several
diﬀerent ways through which the management can influence the relative strength of the two
departments. One such possibility is through the choice of the talent of the people hired for the
two departments. For instance, a firm that faces very strong resistance to change should hire
more able researchers to leverage the internal competition further. This emphasizes the point
made above that strong inertial forces are not necessarily a disadvantage for a firm, but can - if
properly managed - spur both innovation and performance. Again, the general principle is that
the firm chooses a labor force composition that balances the strength of the two departments.
This result is of a similar flavor to early work by Lazear and Rosen (1981) who suggested that
workers in a promotion contest should be matched in groups of similar ability.16 An alternative
way to balance the internal competition is to handicap the stronger department by implementing
a biased "innovation policy". For instance, the management of a firm with strong resistance to
change should implement the technology proposed by the R&D department even if it is not quite
as good as the improved existing technology. One problem that the management faces when
implementing such a policy is that it requires commitment because the less profitable technology
sometimes has to be chosen. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) propose to hire managers with an
intrinsic preference for certain kinds of projects as a solution to the commitment problem. For
example, a "visionary manager" with a preference for new technologies might help to strike a
better balance between a strong production department and a weak R&D department.
Our model deliberately emphasizes the benefits of internal competition and thus the impor-
tance of managing such competition in the most eﬃcient way. However, we do not deny that
competition between the departments might give rise to costs as well. These costs can take the
form of lack of collaboration, failure to establish a corporate culture, influence activities, etc. In
the second part of the paper, we address this issue by looking at the potential distortion that
the threat of internal competition might generate in the choice of the research trajectory. The
problem arises when the R&D department chooses an incremental trajectory instead of a more
radical trajectory to avoid a costly competition with the production department. We show that
the firm can restore the incentives to choose a radical trajectory by implementing the so-called
"skunk works model" of innovation, which consists of isolating the R&D department from the
rest of the firm. This provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first formal analysis of the
skunk works model; an innovation model that has been widely discussed in the business press
and extensively applied by firms like IBM, Siemens, Philips and Intel, among others.
Stretching a bit the boundaries of our model, one could argue that re-adjustment costs in
the case of radical innovations are especially important for large established firms. Thus, our
paper fits well within the organization literature that has analyzed extensively the problems that
16By contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) argue that when the competition between the two departments
results in resources being wasted on influence activities, the firm can potentially mitigate such a negative eﬀect
by making the competition very unbalanced, i.e. by hiring talented employees only in one department.
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large established incumbents have in developing and adopting radical innovations that require
completely new sets of routines and capabilities (Henderson and Clark 1990; Henderson 1993;
Ghemawat 1991). We contribute to this literature by emphasizing that even if established firms
might be endowed with the routines and capabilities to cope with radical innovations, the threat
of costly internal competition might prevent the R&D department from exploring more radical
research trajectories.
Two important considerations for managers have emerged from our analysis of the skunk
works model. First, the key element of the skunk works model is that the information flows
between the R&D department and the rest of the organization are eliminated. This finding
implies that secrecy and autonomy are very important for this organizational solution to function
properly. If it is possible to infer the type of project on which the R&D department is working,
e.g., from financial accounts or internal memos, our analysis suggests that the advantage of the
skunk works model of innovation is lost. Second, our paper shows that in order to induce the
R&D department to choose the radical trajectory, the expected reward it must obtain should be
suﬃciently large. This implies that researchers who are part of a skunk works model must have
a “taste” for radical innovations, that is, they should enjoy working in an experimental, risky,
exciting environment where major breakthroughs could emerge, but where lots of uncertainties
are still unsolved. Thus, the selection of the researchers who should belong to the skunk works
model is a critical task for the management of the firm and its human resources department.
As a final consideration, our approach has stressed the importance of generating incentives
through internal competition when contracting possibilities are either limited or too costly. The
complexities and uncertainties of the innovation process make an incomplete contract approach
quite reasonable within our context. However, we believe that, except in cases where contracting
possibilities are extremely good, the insights of our analysis are still valid and relevant when more
contractual solutions are available. The role of monetary rewards is then to top up non-monetary
incentives and to balance the competition between the departments.
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7 Proof of Lemmata and Propositions
7.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The maximal amount that the RU and the PU would be willing to invest into the contest are pB
and pF , respectively. Following the argument outlined in the proof of Lemma 1, it can be shown
that there does not exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies where the two units randomize
among a finite number of eﬀort levels. Consider instead an equilibrium where the two units
randomize among an infinite number of eﬀort levels. In particular, the PU randomizes among
all eP ∈ [0, pF ] according to the distribution function G(.), and the RU randomizes among all
eR ∈
h
0, pFγ
i
according to the distribution function H(.). Assuming that the RU does not put
probability mass on any eﬀort level, which is satisfied in equilibrium, the expected utility of the
PU can be written as:
UP = p(1−H(eP/γ))(w − eP − F ) + (1− p(1−H(eP /γ)))(w − eP )⇔
H(eR) =
UP − w + pF
pF
+
γeR
pF
.
Turning to the RU, we have:
UR = pG(γeR)(B − eR) + (1− pG(γeR))(−eR)⇔
G(eP ) =
UR
pB
+
eP
pγB
.
Using G(pF ) = 1 and H(pF/γ) = 1, it follows that:
H(eR) =
γeR
pF
for all eR ∈
∙
0,
pF
γ
¸
and UP = w − pF ,
G(eP ) = 1−
F
γB
+
eP
pγB
for all eP ∈ [0, pF ] and UR = p(B −
F
γ
).
Finally, the expected profits of the firm can be written as:
EΠ =
Z pF
γ
0
{G(γeR) [(pγeR + (1− p)E(eP |eP < γeR)] + (1−G(γeR))E(eP |eP > γeR)}h(eR)deR,
where E(eP |eP < γeR) = 1G(γeR)
R γeR
0
eP
pγBdep, and h(eR) =
γ
pF . Simplifying the expression, we
obtain the expected profits reported in the Lemma.
7.2 Proof of Remark 1
The expected eﬀorts are obtained using the distribution functions reported in Lemma 2 and 3
and integrating over the relevant intervals.
7.3 Proof of Remark 2
The comparative statics follow directly from diﬀerentiating the profit expressions in Lemma 2
and 3 and from the expected eﬀorts reported in Remark 1.
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7.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The expected profits are calculated using the equilibrium strategies found in the Appendix.
The sign of ∂π1(α)/∂α follows directly from ∂π1(α)/∂α = [∂π1(α)/∂π0(α)] [∂π0(α)/∂α] where
∂π0(α)/∂α > 0.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 2
A myopic firm chooses α to solve ∂π0(α)/∂α−∂C(α)/∂α = 0 whereas a forwarding-looking firm
solves ∂π0(α)/∂α + ∂π1(α)/∂α − ∂C(α)/∂α = 0. The proof follows then from the concavity of
the profit function in α and the sign of ∂π1(α)/∂α as reported in Lemma 4.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
First notice that Assumption 3 implies that the RU chooses the incremental trajectory under
the integrated model of innovation. Consider now the skunk works model. Here, there cannot
exist an equilibrium where the RU chooses the incremental trajectory. In such an equilibrium,
the PU randomizes according to G(eP ) = 1− FIB +
eP
B for all eP ∈ [0, FI ] and UR = G(eR)B−eR.
The RU has an incentive to deviate to the radical trajectory that results in an expected utility
of pG(γeR)ρB − eR, which is strictly greater than G(eR)B − eR for any given eR since γ > 1
(Assumption 1) and pρ > 1.
Consider instead an equilibrium where the RU chooses the radical trajectory. From Lemma
3 we know that when FR > γρB the PU randomizes in equilibrium according to G(eP ) = ePpγρB
for all eP ∈ [0, pγρB] and UR = 0. Suppose that the RU would deviate to the incremental
trajectory. This would produce an expected utility equal to:
G(γeR)(B − eR) + (1−G(γeR))(−eR) = eR
µ
1
pγρ
− 1
¶
,
which is non-positive since γ > 1 and pρ > 1. Therefore, the RU has no incentive to deviate.
Similarly, when FR < γρB the PU randomizes according to G(eP ) = 1 − FRγρB +
eP
pγρB for all
eP ∈ [0, pFR] and UR = p(ρB − Fγ ). Suppose that the RU would deviate to the incremental
trajectory. This would produce an expected utility equal to B − Fγρ +
eR
pγρ − eR. Since pργ > 1,
the optimal eﬀort when deviating to the incremental trajectory would therefore be eR = 0. This
would result in an expected utility of B− FRργ . It is easy to see that such deviation is not profitable
when pρ > 1. Hence, for pρ > 1 only the radical trajectory can be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome of the game.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
There are two kinds of solutions to the MU’s problem depending on VR > VP or VP ≥ VR.
Consider the MU’s program for the candidate solution where VR > VP ≥ 0. The two contracts
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CP and CR have to satisfy two constraints: a voluntary participation constraint (VPC) and an
incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). There is a one-to-one relation between the eﬀort that
the PU exerts and the value of the technology. The optimal way for the MU to achieve the
desired eﬀort level e∗P is thus to pay a wage W > 0 if VP = e
∗
P and zero otherwise. The incentive
constraint (ICCPU ) in program (1) below assumes this type of wage scheme. The constraint
ensures that the PU’s payoﬀ from choosing e∗P is no less than the payoﬀ from choosing the best
alternative, eP = 0. The voluntary participation constraint (VPCPU ) guarantees to the PU a
payoﬀ greater than or equal to the value of the outside option when the eﬀort e∗P is exerted.
Turning to the contract CR, the RU is paid a wage B for an innovation of value VR = γe∗R.
Innovations of a value diﬀerent from γe∗R and no innovation result in a wage of zero and of B∅ ,
respectively. The incentive constraint is slightly diﬀerent for the RU. Since the optimal contract
rewards only innovations of value γe∗R, the optimal deviation is to choose eR = 0 and report
that no innovation was made. The two constraints (ICCRU ) and (VPCRU ) ensure that deviating
from e∗R is not profitable and that the expected payoﬀ from choosing e
∗
R is at least equal to the
outside option. Finally, adding the wealth constraints and the domains of VP and VR, we arrive
at the following program:
Max(VP ,VR,WP ,BR,B∅ ){pVR − pB − (1− p)B∅ + (1− p)VP −W} (1)
st.
W − VP − pF ≥ −K (VPCPU)
W − VP − pF ≥ −pF (ICCPU)
pB + (1− p)B∅ − VR/γ ≥ −K (VPCRU)
pB + (1− p)B∅ − VR/γ ≥ B∅ (ICCRU)
W,B,B∅ ≥ 0
VP ∈ [0, eP ]
VR ∈ [0, γeR]
The contracts reported in Proposition 4 solve this program.
Consider instead the MU’s program for the candidate solution where VP ≥ VR, program (2).
Here, it is optimal to set VR = 0 because the innovation of the RU is never implemented. That
is, CR : B(VR) = B(∅) = 0 for all VR. In equilibrium the creative eﬀort is thus zero, e∗R = 0, and
the technology is never changed. The MU solves the following problem:
MaxW {VP −W} (2)
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st.
W − VP ≥ −K (VPCPU)
W − VP ≥ 0 (ICCPU)
Since the defensive eﬀort does not create value-added, an optimal contract is CP : W (VP ) = 0
for all VP = 0. These contracts result in expected profits equal to zero.
Finally, comparing the profits for the two candidate solutions, it can be shown that the
contracts derived for the case VR > VP ≥ 0 are optimal.
7.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that the PU dominates and that B > W . Then, the PU randomizes according to
G(eP ) = B−W+ePγpB for all eP ∈ [0, (γp− 1)B +W ] and the RU randomizes according to H(eR) =
1− γBF+W +
γeR
p(F+W ) for all eR ∈ {0} ∪ [(B −W )/γ, pB].
Suppose instead that the PU dominates but that B ≤W . Then, the PU randomizes according
to G(eP ) = B−W+ePγpB for all eP ∈ [W −B, (γp− 1)B +W ] and the RU randomizes according to
H(eR) = 1− γBF+W +
γeR
p(F+W ) for all eR ∈ [0, pB].
The expected profits are calculated as in the proof of Lemma 2, the only diﬀerence being that
the bonuses are monetary and therefore represent a cost for the firm.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 5
We consider two cases, K ≥ pF and K < pF .
Case I: K ≥ pF.
The PU can always ensure a payoﬀ of −pF by choosing eP = 0. Hence, the participation
constraint does not bind and fW = 0. The optimal bonuses are such that B ≥ W since ∂
Π(B,W, 0)/∂W ≤ 0 for W > B. Hence, B ∈ [W, (p(F +W ) −W )/(pγ − 1)] where the upper
bound on B guarantees that the PU dominates. Notice that this implies thatW ∈ [0, F/(γ−1)].
Since ∂2Π(B,W, 0)/∂B2 > 0, there are two sets of solutions depending on B = W or B =
(p(F + W ) − W )/(pγ − 1). Consider first the candidate solutions for which B = W . Since
∂2Π(W,W, 0)/∂W 2 > 0, the candidate solutions are B =W = 0 and B =W = F/(γ − 1).
Consider instead the candidate solutions for which B = (p(F +W ) −W )/(pγ − 1). Here,
∂2Π((p(F +W )−W )/(pγ−1),W, 0)/∂W 2 > 0. This results in an additional candidate solution,
B = pF/(pγ − 1) and W = 0, plus the previous candidate solution B =W = F/(γ − 1).
Finally, comparing the profits of the three candidate solutions, the result reported in the
proposition is obtained.
Case II: K < pF.
From (Program of the MU) follows that there are two cases to consider. The (VPCPU ) binds
for B > K/(pγ − 1) whereas it does not bind for B ≤ K/(pγ − 1). Only the proof for the case
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K/(pγ − 1) < F/(γ − 1) is included, but the proof for the other case is similar. Details are
available upon request.
As in Case I, it has to hold that B ∈ [W, (p(F +W )−W )/(pγ − 1)] and W ∈ [0, F/(γ − 1)].
Furthermore, because ∂2Π(B,W, 0)/∂B2 > 0 both for B > K/(pγ− 1) and B ≤ K/(pγ− 1), the
optimal bonus B is a corner solution.
Consider first B ∈ [W,K/(pγ − 1)] where fW = 0. There are two sets of solutions depending
on B = W or B = Kpγ−1 (as
K
pγ−1 <
p(F+W )−W
pγ−1 in the case considered). Similar to Case I,
the candidate solutions for B = W are: i) B = W = 0 and ii) B = W = K/(pγ − 1). For
B = Kpγ−1 , it can be shown that ∂Π(
K
pγ−1 ,W, 0)/∂B < 0. Hence, the candidate solution is: iii)
B = Kpγ−1 andW = 0. Comparing the three candidate solutions, ∂Π(
K
pγ−1 ,W, 0)/∂B < 0 implies
that candidate solution iii) dominates candidate solution ii). Furthermore, candidate solution iii)
dominates candidate solution i) because Π(0, 0, 0) < Π( Kpγ−1 , 0, 0). Hence, the optimal bonuses
for B ∈ [W,K/(pγ − 1)] are B = K/(pγ − 1) and W = 0.
Consider instead B ∈ [K/(pγ − 1), (p(F +W ) −W )/(pγ − 1)] where fW = B(γp − 1) −K.
For B = K/(pγ − 1), the relevant candidate solution is again: i) B = K/(pγ − 1) and W = 0.
For B = p(F+W )−Wpγ−1 , ∂
2Π((p(F +W )−W )/(pγ − 1),W, 0)/∂W 2 > 0 implies that the candidate
solutions are: ii) B = W = F/(γ − 1) > K/(pγ − 1) and iii) B = pFpγ−1 and W = 0. Here, as
Π(K/(pγ−1), 0, 0) > Π(K/(pγ−1),K/(pγ−1), 0) > Π(F/(γ−1), F/(γ−1), F (γp−1)/(γ−1)−K),
candidate solution i) dominates candidate solution ii). Furthermore, as ∂Π(B, 0, B(γp − 1) −
K)/∂B < 0 for B > K/(pγ − 1), candidate solution i) dominates candidate solution iii).
Summarizing the two cases, the optimal bonuses are B = pF/(pγ−1) andW = 0 forK < pF .
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